In this note we show the consistency of majority decisions under preference conditions that are more general than Single-Peaked Preferences (Arrow [1] , Black [2] ), Single-Caved Preferences (Inada [5] ), Preferences separable into Two Groups (Inada [5] ), and Latin-Square-less Preferences (Ward [121). In the first part of the note, the underlying concepts and approach are introduced; in the second part the theorem is stated and proved; and in the third part its relationship with other sufficiency conditions is discussed.
FOR ANY set of alternatives, the voters who are indifferent between all of them raise some peculiar problems for the consistency of majority decisions. So we first separate them out.
DEFINITION: A Concerned Individual with respect to a set of alternatives is one who is not indifferent between all the alternatives. An individual who is indifferent between all alternatives is Unconcerned.
Each individual is assumed to have a weak ordering ranging over all alternatives. Notationally, x RI y stands for the ith individual regarding alternative x to be at least as good as alternative y, and x Pi y stands for the ith individual preferring x to y, which is equivalent to x Ri y, and not y Ri x. We follow Arrow (rather than Black) in defining the method of majority decisions. Let x R y stand for x being socially regarded at least as good as y, and x P y stands for the corresponding social preference, i.e., for x R y, and not y R x.1 DEFINITION: The method of majority decisions means that x R y if and only if the number of individuals such that x Ri y is at least as great as the number of individuals such that y Ri x. 2 The consistency of the majority decisions for a set of two alternatives has been shown by Arrow, but inconsistency can arise when there are three or more alternatives. We shall find the following lemma useful.3 1 We shall be avoiding discussion of the important problems arising from "strategic masking or distorting of preferences" (see Rothenberg [9] ; see also Majumdar [7] and Luce and Raiffa [6] ). Also the lack of a one-to-one correspondence between preferences and voting in a model of continuous utility maximization, no matter whether the utility from voting is taken to be zero, positive, or negative (see Sen [10] ). 2 It is easy to check that the method of majority decisions satisfies the conditions of reflexivity (x R x), and connectedness (either x R y or y R x). The only property of a weak social ordering that is in doubt is transitivity. 3 Ward [12] discusses this, and though he confines his attention to a strict social ordering corresponding to theP-relation, which does not have the property of reflexivity and connectedness, our proof is nevertheless very similar to his. LEMMA 1: If among a set of alternatives there is no triple such that, given the set of individual preferences, the method of majority decision gives intransitive results between them, then the method will give consistent results for the entire set of alternatives.
PROOF: Suppose, to the contrary, there is no such triple, but there is nevertheless an inconsistency involving more than three (say, n) alternatives. We have, let us say, the following inconsistent result: It is easy to check that with three alternatives, x, y, and z, all intransitivities must imply one and exactly one of the following, which for convenience we give two (rather arbitrary) names:
Forward Circle: x R y, y R z, and z R x . Backward Circle: y R x, x R z, and z R y .
The existence of one of these circles is necessary for intransitivity, but it is not sufficient, for which we need, in addition, the absence "of the other.
First take the forward circle. Since x R y and y R z,
N(x _y) _ N(y _ x), and N(y _ z) _ N(z >y).
By adding the two inequalities, we have imply that x is not a "worst" alternative, and that z is not a "worst" alternative. The theorem proved in this note covers all the cases. 6 Inada's Possibility Theorem for Single-Caved Preferences [5] uses a concept opposite to that of Arrow's Single-Peakedness.7 If y is "between" x and z, then y Ri x -+ z Pi y. This means: Not(y Ri x, and y Ri z). This only requires that y not have the value "best." The other cases of Single-Caved Preferences rule out, respectively, x being "best," and z being "best." All these cases are, therefore, subsumed in the theorem proved in the last section.
respectively (ii) and (iv), and (iii) and (vi). When x, y, or z cannot be "worst" for any concerned individual, we have respectively, (ii) and (vi), (iii) and (v), and (i) and (iv). When x, y, or z cannot be "medium" for any concerned individual, we have respectively, (iii) and (iv), (i) and (vi), and (ii) and (v). Thus, in every case of Value-Restricted Preferences, at least one of the conditions (i)-(iii) and at least one of the conditions (iv)-(vi) are satisfied. Since the number of concerned individuals is odd for every triple, it follows from
We can now consider Inada's theorem for preferences such that the "set of alternatives [are] separable into two groups" A and B, with any alternative in A being always preferred to any alternative in B, or vice versa. Such separability for all alternatives is equivalent to the separability for all triples.8 Suppose A consists of x and B of (y, z). Now, we have: (1) x Pi y if and only if x Pi z, (2) y Pi x if and only if z Pi x, and (3) either x Pi y or y Pi x. This excludes all possibilities where x can be "medium." The other cases of separability into two groups exclude respectively y and z being "medium." All these cases are, therefore, also covered by our theorem.
Ward's [12] Latin-Square-lessness applies to cases with strong ordering, but in those cases they are exactly equivalent to Value-Restricted Preferences. Under these special conditions, Ward shows that if among the preference orderings of all individuals for any triple, there are not three that form a latin square, then majority decisions (in the sense of strict orderings, P-relation) will be transitive.9 Assuming strong ordering with our Value-Restricted preferences, it is easy to check that a latin square cannot be formed of the permitted preferences of the concerned individuals.10 Thus Ward's cases are subsumed in the cases covered here, and hold for majority decisions interpreted both as the R-relation and the P-relation.
It should be added that the theorems which are shown to be subsumed by the 6 The extension proposed by Dummett and Farquharson 14] is, however, not covered. But they solve a different problem from ours, viz., when will a set of alternatives "have a top," i.e., "there should be at least one outcome x such that for every other outcome y some majority regards x as at least as good as y" (p. 40). Dummett and Farquharson show that for this it is sufficient to assume that "of every three outcomes there is one which no voter thinks worse than both the other two" (p. 40). It is easily checked, however, that this is not sufficient for the requirement of transitivity of majority decisions. Take, for example, the following three orderings: (1) When this question of unconcerned individuals is ignored, however, and N (x = y = z) is taken to be zero, the set of our cases partitions exactly into three proper subsets of cases: (I) When one alternative cannot be "best," equivalent to Single-Caved Preferences; (II) When one alternative cannot be "worst," equivalent to Single-Peaked Preferences, and (III) when one alternative cannot be "medium," equivalent to the case of alternatives Separable into Two Groups.
Value-Restricted Preferences for Concerned Individuals
Since mine is only an attempt to extend the pioneering work of Arrow, Black, Inada, Vickrey, and Ward, I end with a chart explaining the relationship between the assumptions made in the theorem proved here and the assumptions made in their respective theorems. (See figure 1.) It is important to note, however, that we need not assume that the same "restriction" holds for one triple that holds for another. If it is possible for one triple to have, say, Single-Peaked Preferences, and another triple to have, say, SingleCaved Preferences, and so on, the Theorem will still be valid, though such cases will not be covered by either of the three separate theorems involving SinglePeakedness, Single-Cavedness, and Separability. Consider, for example, the following set of five preference orderings over four alternatives (w, x, y, z): It would seem that Value-Restricted Preferences will cover a variety of practical cases. A comparatively limited measure of agreement seems to be sufficient to guarantee consistent majority decisions, and to get from it a Social Welfare Function with the other properties specified by Arrow.
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